More on widgets: Exploring the Network
In my last musings about widget security, I was very brief about the Flickr Interestingness and Hockey widgets. After all, they both just provide the AllowNetworkAccess capability. I had overlooked that there is a shared cookie store on the Mac, shared, that is, at least by Safari and the Dashboard. From a bit of experimenting, it seems like that sharing affects all non-session cookies.
Now, what does that mean? A widget with the AllowNetworkAccess privilege can issue HTTP requests anywhere. These HTTP requests will carry the same cookies as a request from a just-started Safari instance. Therefore, any Web application that relies on persistent cookies for authentication (like many Web 2.0 services) can be used by such a Widget without the user's permission.
There are several attack scenarios here: A subverted widget could be a bridgehead behind a corporate firewall, with convenient access to intranet applications. And when a Web 2.0 site serves as the path through which a widget is exploited, then subverting widgets with AllowNetworkAccess might in fact be enough to deploy some rather interesting malware.
